In this paper we describe vulnerabilities and possible protections for mobile ad hoc networks (MANET) routing protocols. Vulnerability and adversary models are built to describe impersonation, fabrication and modification attacks. A security model is proposed, considering both preventive and corrective protection. The basic preventive protection consists of a certificate-based authentication mechanism, which is designed as a MANET authentication extension (MAE) that provides authentication for all routing protocol messages. Corrective protection consists of an intrusion detection and response service (IDS). Certification service and IDS are both provided in a distributed and self-organized manner. Intrusion response is mainly defined in terms of interaction between certification service and IDS. The proposed vulnerability analysis and security design are detailed and validated using the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) Protocol.
Introduction
In this paper we propose a new security model for protection of MANET routing protocol. The salient features in our design are:
• Combination of both preventive and corrective protection;
• Self-organized conception of security services, in the sense that security services are provided collaboratively, without assumption on any centralized entity; • Fully localized solutions, restricting communication overheads within nearby nodes; and • Robustness in the presence of node compromising, combining both preventive and corrective security services. As a basic preventive solution, a digital certificate based authentication service is proposed for the routing protocol messages. The companion certificate services are also proposed, as an extension to [1, 2] , which is designed to be self-organized and fully localized. An intrusion detection and response system (IDS) provides the corrective solution feeding the certification service with information about misbehaving nodes, which are eliminated from the network by certification revocation.
The proposed model is completely developed for protection of the Optimized Link State Routing (OLSR) Protocol [3] . Validation of the proposed model is obtained from actual implementation of security services for the OLSR.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: In section 2, we discuss the vulnerability and adversary models. Section 3 is devoted to description of the security model. Section 4 details the development of the proposed solution for protection of the OLSR. Section 5 describes the implementation and results obtained from experimentation. Section 6 discusses related work and section 7 concludes the paper with our final remarks.
Security (Protection) Model
MANET context imposes strong requirements in the protection model. The MANET requirements considered in our security model are:
• Mobility: nodes in a MANET may, at any time, disappear from, appear into or move within the network. Therefore, availability of an individual node cannot be assured security services cannot rely on a central entity.
• Locality: the error prone nature of the wireless links and the limited bandwidth requires that security services must be provided collaboratively by nearby nodes, most often by 1-hop neighbor nodes.
• Intrusion Tolerance: security solution should be robust in the existence of compromised nodes in the network, given the non-negligible probability for node break-ins.
To cope with mobility of the MANET nodes, we do not assume in our design the existence of any centralized entity in the network. Instead, we take the self-organized approach by adopting fully localized mechanisms and relying on the collaboration for the provision of the security services.
Self-organization is illustrated in Figure 1 . An autonomous instance of each security service must be active in each MANET node. These instances are generally called Local Service (L-Service). A L-Service collaborates with L-Services from nearby nodes (usually in the neighborhood), by means of some collaboration protocol. This sense of self-organization is exactly the same used in the very conception of the MANET routing service, the L-Service being represented by the MANET routing protocol daemon, which is autonomously executed in each MANET node, the collaboration protocol being represented by the MANET routing protocol. In our design, protection of the routing protocol includes both preventive and corrective security services.
A certificate-based authentication service for the routing protocol messages is considered as a basic preventive solution. The authentication service aims to avoid an attack to be generated from a nonauthenticated node. However, according to the presumed adversary model (section 2.2), attacks are still possible in two situations: (1) an authenticated node (e.g. certificate holder) starts to behave maliciously; or (2) a MANET node has been compromised and the authentication secret (e.g. private key) from that node has been exposed. The corrective security service is provided in terms of an intrusion detection and response system (IDS). Intrusion response consists mainly in the isolation of compromised nodes, excluding them from the routing service. This is accomplished by means of certificate revocation.
Certification services and intrusion detection and response should be provided in a self-organized and distributed manner by a Local Certification Service (L-Cert) and a Local IDS (LIDS) instances [10] . Figure 2 illustrates the proposed protection model. Basically, routing protocol, certification service and IDS (alert) message exchanges must be authenticated with a MANET authentication extension (MAE), which is appended to each message and provides the authentication information. Authentication is based on the certification service and uses asymmetric cryptography primitives. Each node in the MANET must hold a valid certificate, binding the node's identity to its public key.
Whenever a node is broken, an adversary becomes able to impersonate the compromised node and may fabricate/modify not only routing protocol messages but, also, certificate service messages and alerts (IDS message). In order to maintaining the robustness of the security solution in the presence of compromised nodes, security services in our system are designed to have k-by-n security, in the sense that any certification service or intrusion response must be collaboratively provided by, at least, k nodes, where n is the total (non-fixed) number of nodes in the network. Thus, for compromising a security service, an adversary must break into k different nodes.
Correct nodes running the LIDS must detect the attacks against the routing protocol and isolate the compromised node (by revoking its certificate) before that an adversary can compromise k nodes, breaking the collaborative security system.
Given that collaboration is done by means of authenticated messages (certificate services and IDS messages are all authenticated using MAE), isolating a node is equivalent to revoking the node's certificate.
An indirect revocation mechanism is related to certification expiration. Thus, security can be improved if we require that certificates must be renewed from time to time. Certificates are issued with constrained certificate expiration time. Each node having a valid certificate must request for a new certificate, before the current certificate has expired. Nodes that are not well behaving should not have their certificates renewed.
Finally, locality requirement states that collaboration should be designed to restrict communications among L-Services (e.g. local certificate services and LIDSes) around nearby nodes, usually in the local neighborhood. This is an important requirement as it relates to the scalability of the overall solution.
Considering the locality requirement stated above, k becomes an important parameter and should be related to the average size of neighborhoods in the network. If a node has k or more neighbors, IDS and certification services can be fully provided in the local neighborhood. Thus, the security solution is scalable, in the sense that security services are run locally, provided a convenient choice for the parameter k.
When trying to compromise other nodes, an attacker should act incorrectly in the behalf of the compromised node (impersonation). 
MANET Certification Service
The design of self-organized certification services in MANET has been discussed in a few recent papers [1, 2, 12] , which are based on a distributed certification authority (DCA) trust model. The CA secret key (K CA ) is used to sign certificates for all nodes in the MANET. A certificate signed with K CA can be readily verified with the well-known system public key. The distribution of the CA capabilities is achieved by sharing the secret key among network nodes by means of threshold cryptography techniques [13] . Each MANET node holds a private-key-share (SK CA ) and any k (a system wide constant, usually related to the average number of neighbors) of such private-key-share holders can collective function as a CA. The K CA , however, is not recoverable by any node. Counter-certificate issuing does certificate revocation, which must also be signed with K CA .
Our proposal is based on [1, 2] , with the following improvements [14] : (1) Certification issuing and renewal in [1, 2] follows some pre-established rule. In our design, instead of having such a fixed rule, we propose a set of policy configurable options for issuing of new certificates, certificate renewal, private-key-share issuing and updating. This policy may be used to enforce that new certificate and SK CA issuing in the DCA following strictly the same identity verification that an equivalent centralized CA, avoiding multiple identity faking attacks (sybil attacks) [16] . This identity check can be adapted to the MANET context, using the notion of communities, for example [21] .
(2) Approaches described in [1, 2] do not specify how valid certificates are acquired and stored in each node. Also, local Certification Revocation Lists (CRL) are progressively built by accumulating counter-certificates that are flooded in the network. However, synchronization of newly arrived nodes (which must initialize their empty CRL) is left unspecified. We propose a set of policy configurable options for distribution and localized maintenance of valid certificates and certificate revocation list. These options include: choice for proactive or on-demand construction of local valid certificates and CRL databases; time for keeping an unused valid certificate in the cache; and maximum size for the valid certificate cache.
(3) Designs from [1, 2] are based on a single DCA. We extend the model to supporting multiple DCA and trust path constructions.
Authentication for Securing Routing Protocols
The authentication service considered in our model is provided by a MANET authentication extension (MAE), which is appended to each routing protocol message or packet. This MAE contains all the authentication information required to correctly assure authenticity and integrity to the message or packet being protected. Our objective is to design such extension in a flexible and adaptable way, so that it could be used to secure different MANET routing protocols. The idea is to preserve the routing protocol packet and message syntax unchanged, differently from previous work [22] [23] [24] .
Authentication Objects: MAE is composed by authentication objects. At least one (mandatory) authentication object should be present in the MAE and alternatively contains a message authentication code (MAC) object, which is computed as a hash-function applied to the data being authenticated keyed with a private-key-shared team key, or a digital signature (DS) object. MAC/DS authenticates all the nonmutable fields of a routing protocol packet/message. Additional authentication objects are used to provide optional services. Currently defined options are signer certificate (using to carry the certificate of the MAE signer within the message), hash chains information (keeping additional authentication data related to the protection of the mutable fields in the packet/message of AODV and DSR) and sequence number (for reply protection) [14] .
Mutable Fields: In DSR and AODV, MANET routing protocols there are messages that progressively change while they are forwarded by intermediate nodes in the path between message source and destination [5, 6] . While it is desirable that this mutable information should also be protected, such protection usually implies in increasing the authentication information size each time the message is forwarded. This is not surprising as the information contained in the message is due to all nodes that have previously forwarded it and, each of them should be authenticated in general. Some methods to protect typical mutable information (e.g. hop count, IP address based routing trace, etc.) have been proposed [25] and may be used in our design.
MAE for DSR, AODV, OLSR and TBRPF
OLSR and TBRPF are proactive link-state routing protocols whose message don't have mutable fields in the routing messages that are actually used by the respective routing protocol algorithm. MAE for securing OLSR and TBRPF is simply built with a single authentication object containing MAC or digital signature (DS).
AODV have mutable fields in route request (RREQ) and route reply (RREP). These fields are hop count metrics that are changed every time the packet is processed and forwarded by nodes between the message source and destination. A hash chain object (HC) [24] is included and updated each time these fields change (e.g. each time the message is processed and forward). Such protection avoids that an attacker could decrement the hop count. Route error (RERR) messages are signed only by the node forwarding them. Route reply acknowledgments (RREP-ACK) have no mutable fields and are only authenticated by the message originator.
Securing DSR is quite more complex, although limited security can be achieved by combining the mandatory authentication object with a hash chain object implementing a per-hop hashing schema in RREQ messages. This will avoid an attacker from faking of the initiator node and from removing correct IP address in the route list [26] . RREP messages could be simply signed by the target of the route discovery (e.g. the node originating the RREP message). Table 1 illustrates the main features of each MANET routing protocol and MAE requirements for each of them. 
Authentication and Certification Policy Issues
MAE and certification service specifications are provided with a set of configurable options that should be used to define a security context that is adapted to the security requirements of the MANET security policy. Figure 3 below summarizes all the authentication and certification policy parameters considered in our design. See [14] for further details. 
Collaborative Intrusion Detection and Response
Present intrusion detection concerns are usually divided in three main processes: data collection, detection algorithm design and alert management [17] .
The requirement specification from the IETF Intrusion Detection Exchange Format Working Group (IDWG) 1 proposes an IDS model consisting of three modules: Sensor, Analyzer and Manager, each of them being related with one of the intrusion detection processes [17] . More precisely, a Sensor collects data from a data source, an Analyzer processes the collected data for detecting signs of events that might have security concerns and the Manager stands for the management interface of whole process, besides of doing alert correlation and response initiation.
The IDWG model also defines messages (or data flows) exchanged by these elements. Thus, activities monitored by the Sensor in the data source may be mapped in events, which are passed to the Analyzer, where they are submitted to the detection algorithm. When the Analyzer finds events with relevant security concerns, alerts are generated to the Manager.
Given the lack of centralization, the mobility of the nodes and the wireless nature of link connections in the MANET environment, some (if not all) of the tasks required for the intrusion detection process described above should be executed in a distributed and cooperative manner [10, 19] . To active these objectives, the MANET-adapted IDS is designed with the following features: (1) each MANET node runs an autonomous instance of a local IDS (LIDS); (2) each LIDS is functionally complete, in the sense that it may execute the whole detection process (e.g. data collection, detection algorithm execution and alert management); (3) LIDS collaborate with each using a mechanism that takes into account the restrictions resulting from the MANET context; e.g. limited bandwidth or poor connectivity. 
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Sensor: Data Sources
In our process, the data collected for intrusion detection consists of all routing protocol messages, which are obtained from the authentication service. The sensor also maintains information about the neighborhood topology and the protocol message scheduling, which are used to extract information from a new received message that could be relevant to the detection process.
Analyzer: Intrusion Detection Algorithm
The Analyzer processes the events according to some defined detection strategy. At least two detection methodologies are currently in discussion: misuse and anomaly detection [20] . Misuse detection relates to the identification of patterns (e.g. event sequences) that characterizes a known attack type, which are called attack signatures. Alternatively, anomaly detection consists in characterizing the normal system behavior and detecting deviations from this normal pattern.
In our model, we use the misuse intrusion detection strategy. The principal advantage of the misuse approach relates to the possibility of identification of the attack type being detected and even, in some cases, the identification of the attack source. This last feature is required in our design, as intrusion detection is used to identify misbehaving nodes that must be isolated.
In misuse IDS, attack signature should be supplied for each attack (or class of attacks) that must be detected. Attack signatures can be generally described by patterns that become observable when the attack is launched. In the case of modification, fabrication and impersonation attacks against the routing protocol, these patterns correspond to anomalies in the scheduling of the routing protocol or inconsistencies in the routing information advertised simultaneously by different nodes. If such attack signatures are available, the IDS can be designed as a monitoring system that identifies occurrences of patterns during the routing protocol operation, associated with attacks.
Collaboration in the Intrusion Detection
The Distribution Manager module receives all IDS messages (e.g. event, query and alert), either if the message was locally generated or received from remote nodes, and decides if the message should be consumed locally or if it should be dispatched to a remote node. The IDS Cooperation protocol module implements the communication aspects of the cooperation. Data collection is always local but relevant events may be communicated to other remote nodes in order to help them in the intrusion detection processing. Also, if a LIDS needs to know about an event that may be occurring in a remote node, it can query the remote node by sending a query message.
Collaboration in the Intrusion Response
As a general rule, each node must monitor the behavior of neighbor nodes. LIDS executes this monitoring. If an adversary launches an attack against the routing protocol, correct neighbors receiving the faked routing protocol message may possibly detect the attack. The nodes detecting the attack collaborate with its neighbors to provide intrusion response by signing an accusation (alert) against the detected adversary. This alert is also sent to the local certification service, which signs a partial counter-certificate for the adversary. Partial counter-certificates are flooded in the network. Correct nodes may collect alerts from different nodes detecting and attack. A node collecting, at least, k accusations against the same adversary will also sign a partial counter-certificate for it, even if the node haven't detect any attack coming from that adversary by itself.
Redundancies in the MANET should compensate for the nodes that are not cooperating in the detection and response processes. Indeed, it will be shown that it is possible for more than one single node to track and detect the same attack. If any combination of k nodes in the network detects an attack coming from the same adversary, the adversary's certificate will be revoked.
OLSR Vulnerability and Protection Analysis
OLSR Background
The status of the OLSR specification is Internet Draft [3] . OLSR operates as a table driven proactive routing protocol, which means that it is based on the regular exchange of network topology information between nodes. The topological information is used for updating the routing table of participating nodes by means of a link-state routing algorithm. The routing metric is always hop-distance. Thus, the protocol gives minimum hop distance routing when the network is in a stable state. Optimization over a pure link state algorithm is obtained by reducing the size of control messages and minimizing flooding of control traffic, which is executed only by some selected nodes called MPR (Multi Point Relays). OLSR communicates using a unified packet format for all data related to the protocol. Each packet is carried in a UDP datagram and contains one or more OLSR messages.
The nodes use HELLO messages to detect and update their neighbor set. Each node periodically broadcasts HELLO messages, containing information about heard neighbor interfaces and their link status. The link status may either be "symmetric" (link has been verified to be symmetrical), "heard" (link is asymmetrical), "MPR" (node is selected as MPR, link must also be symmetric) or "lost" (neighbor have moved away). HELLO messages are periodically broadcasted from each node to all 1-hop neighbors and emitted on each MANET interface of the node. These messages are not relayed to other nodes.
Each node in the network independently selects its own MPR set among his "symmetric" neighborhood. The MPR set must be computed by a node in such a way that, through the neighbors in the MPR set, it can reach all symmetric 2-hop neighbors, which are not at the same time symmetric neighbors of the node.
For provision of routes to faraway nodes, each node maintains topological information about the network. This information is acquired by means of OLSR topology control (TC) messages and is used for routing table updates. Nodes that have been selected as MPR by other nodes periodically generate the TC messages, which contain the list of all selector nodes (MS). TC messages are flooded to the whole network by the MPR nodes. A "Message Sequence Number" field is used to avoid duplicated message processing.
OLSR Vulnerabilities
The attacks being described here rely on the fabrication of OLSR HELLO and TC messages or on modification of OLSR TC messages. All attacks basically have denial-of-service (DoS) effects. Table 2 summarizes the attack identification following the vulnerability model described in section 2.1. 
Attack 1: Routing Disruption by Fabrication of HELLO Messages
In this attack, showed in Figure 5 , the adversary fabricates a HELLO message advertising all nodes previously announced in any HELLO message received by the adversary, along with one additional unused address, with "symmetric" link status. This should cause target nodes to select the attacker as MPR. Traffic going from/through the target toward nodes that are not direct neighbors is forward to the adversary node. Figure 6 illustrates this attack, where one attacker should generate a spoofed HELLO message after receiving a correct HELLO message, advertising all nodes announced in correct message with "lost" link status. The node being impersonated is the same node that originated the correct message. When receiving the faked HELLO message, all nodes that have their address advertised in the message would have the status of the link with the target changed to "heard", stopping to send traffic to this link. 
Attack 2: Routing Disruption by Fabrication+Impersonation of HELLO Messages
Attack 3: Routing Disruption by Fabrication of TC Message
In this attack (Figure 7) , the attacker fabricates a TC message advertising faraway nodes as part of his MS set. This should cause targets to choose routing to these faraway nodes through the attacker. 
Attack 4: Routing Disruption by Modification of TC Message
In this attack (Figure 8 ), the attacker changes the "message sequence number" of a TC message, before forwarding it. The "message sequence number" in the modified message is obtained by adding the advertised "message sequence number" with some integer value. Such attack would stop the processing and forwarding of TC messages from the node advertised as originator in the TC message in the whole network. 1 -TC message from node A (target): "message sequence number" = x 2 -Attacker forwards the received TC message with "message sequence number" modified to x+i (an integer). This will cause A, C and D to stop processing and forwarding TC messages from A with "message sequence number" < x+i. 
OLSR Message Authentication
None of the OLSR messages (e.g. HELLO, TC, MID, HNA and FRR) has any mutable fields in the message data. However, each message has a message header, which contains a "hop count" and a "time to live" mutable fields. HELLO and FRR messages are broadcasted only in the originator neighborhood, while TC, MID and HNA messages are flooded in the whole network. Given that these fields are not used in the routing table calculation but only in the flooding algorithm (which is robust by itself, provided that there are redundancies in the network topology), no additional protection is required for authentication of the mutable fields. Thus, OLSR MAE consists of a single digital signature, authenticating all fields in message data and in the message header, except from the "hop count" and "time to live" fields, which must be zeroed for the digital signature computation.
OLSR Intrusion Detection
OLSR intrusion detection is accomplished by implementation of Sensor and Analyzer modules that must, respectively, collect information related to the attacks described in section 4.2 and analyze the information searching for occurrences of patterns representing signatures for each one of the attack. Whenever detecting an attack, the Analyzer generates the respective alert and pass it to both Manager and Distribution Manager modules, which will collaborate with other nodes to provide the intrusion response.
The collected information (Sensor) consists of all HELLO and TC routing messages and some topological information maintained by the routing daemon (e.g. 1-hop and 2-hop neighbor tables). Information analysis (Analyzer) is done whenever a new HELLO or TC message arrives and consists in the identification of the attack signature as described bellow:
• Attack 1: This attack can be characterized by identification of inconsistency in routing information from different HELLO messages. Nodes that can hear HELLO messages from both the attacker and some other node that is not heard by the attacker can detect the attack by verification of inconsistencies in these messages.
• Attack 2: This attack can be characterized by the anomaly in the scheduling of routing messages related to the reception of both correct and spoofed messages with the same originator information and advertising the link type of some neighbor as "lost" and as "symmetric" (or "MPR") in the same HELLO_INTERVAL period.
• Attack 3: This attack can be characterized by the presence of inconsistencies in the routing information advertised simultaneously by different nodes. As the fake TC message should be flooded in the network, this message will eventually arrive at the nodes being advertised as MS and at their neighbors, as well. These nodes can detect the attack, as advertised nodes do not have the adversary in their neighbor set.
• Attack 4: This attack can be characterized by the anomaly in the scheduling of routing messages. The actual originator node and its neighbors, which receive both correct and modified TC messages, can detect the attack by verifying the occurrence of TC messages from the same originator, advertising the same MS set but with different "message sequence number", during the same TC_INTERVAL period.
Implementation and Results
The MAE and the local certification service were implemented along with the available implementation of OLSR v.3. The openssl library 2 was used for the cryptography routines. The LIDS was coded separately, and mobile agents were used for collaborative intrusion detection [10] . Attacks described above were implemented by using the tcpdump packet capture library (libpcap) 3 . The developed platform was tested in an experimental MANET with 10 nodes running on Linux/Intel laptops with IEEE 802.11b cards. Two of them are playing the role of adversary/compromised nodes. Figure 9 shows a sample topology for the network during experimentation. Note that in this topology, any correct MANET node (e.g. A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H) has neighbor set with minimum size of 3 neighbors. Thus, the number of nodes in certification service coalition was fixed to k = 3 in all experiments. Certification renewal was required at each 60 minutes. 
Computational and Network Performance Considerations
Overhead of the proposed protocols has been preliminarily evaluated through our experiments with the OLSR implementation. Considering the network overhead, a MAE transmitted without certificates have a fixed size of 72 bytes, for an RSA key of 512 bits. Average size of OLSR messages depends on the network size and density. For example, in a 100 nodes MANET, which are uniformly distributed over a 1000m x 1000m area and having a transmission range of 200 m, the average size of a HELLO message is 64.26 bytes (each node having an average neighborhood of 12.56 nodes). The high overhead represented by the MAE is due to the use of asymmetric cryptography. In our experiments the message size observed were comparatively smaller, because our real MANET had only 10 nodes. In any case, an OLSR packet containing a HELLO or TC message and a certificate loaded MAE do not oversize the 512-byte packet limit of the OLSR implementation.
LIDS network overhead were limited to alert propagation during detection of any attack in the neighborhood of the node detecting the attack.
Computational overhead of the authentication service was evaluated indirectly. The most expensive operation in MAE generation and verification is RSA signature and verification, respectively. In the verification process, two signatures may be verified, if the MAE signer certificate is not cached and must be validated. Time for executing a RSA signature generation and verification (512-bits key) were averaged in a Pentium III (900MHz, 128Mbytes de RAM, running Red Hat Linux with kernel 2.4.7) to 9ms and 2.6ms, respectively. The normal OLSR packet processing (packet reception) was estimated in 2.5ms. Storage requirements of our proposal are mainly related to certificate cache storage (as CRL can not oversize k, a small constant). If all certificates in the 100 nodes MANET being simulated were locally cached, a 26kbyte cache is due, which is perfectly reasonable.
Memory and CPU usage for both the MANET routing protocol daemon (which also implements both authentication and certification services) and for the LIDS process were evaluated. The routing protocol daemon have demonstrated to be by far more resource-consuming than the LIDS process. These evaluations were done in the 10 nodes experimental MANET, which is a short-sized network. However, we believe that these results should not change significantly in larger networks, given the localized design of the security solutions adopted.
Security Evaluation
Attacks have been successful in corrupting routing when authentication was disabled for the routing protocol. All four attacks were played by the adversary nodes X and Y. Attack effects were analyzed for this topology in three different scenarios: (1) with no protection at all; (2) with only preventive protection (authentication); and (3) with both preventive and corrective (IDS) protections.
In the first scenario, routing disruption was readily obtained and persisted while the adversaries continued to send the fake messages. In the second scenario, the adversaries needed to have a valid certificate to authenticate messages, in order to successfully realize the attacks. This is equivalent of the compromising of some MANET node. If the attacks were played with valid authentication information, the same results that have been observed in scenario 1 for the routing disruption were observed. Finally, in the third scenario, the attack effects on routing disruption were completely mitigated, all the attacks being detected, with no false negatives, by at least 3 nodes that had collaborated to isolate both the adversaries. Table 3 summarizes the observed attack effects in the correct node A suffering attacks from X. Mobility analysis was only carried out in theory. Simulations are being carried out on this issue, especially in the concerns of false positive (a node moves/fails/leaves and temporary topology inconsistence is detected) and false negatives (an attacker moves to avoid it certificate for being revoked) in the intrusion detection, due to mobility.
Another important issue concerns the choice for the k parameter. Clearly, there is a tradeoff between security and performance/availability in this choice. If k is choose to be lesser then the neighborhood size, all services are locally provided. However, if there are compromised nodes it is possible that there isn't enough correct nodes in the neighborhood for local intrusion detection. In our experiments, we have chosen k = 3 because our neighborhood size is 5, so even in the presence of 2 compromised nodes (the maximum number of compromised nodes allowed in this security solution), we shall have at least 3 correct nodes (the minimum number of nodes required to detect the attack). This may suggest that k = 2*ns -1, where ns equals the neighborhood size. Further investigation should be made in this aspect.
The initial certificate distribution in our experiments was done out-of-band but certification renewal automatically executed at each 60 minutes. As long as the correct nodes detects X and Y as misbehaving nodes, these cannot renew the certificate anymore.
Extension to Other MANET Routing Protocols
OLSR [3] and TBRPF [7] messages do not have any mutable fields that are directly used by the routing algorithm, and so, the authentication data in the MAE for these protocols is a single digital signature. MAE for AODV [5] and DSR [6] must provide additional data to authenticate the mutable fields of these protocol messages, such as additional digital signature (signed by nodes modifying and forwarding the original message [22] ) or hash chains [23, 24] .
LIDS design must be carried out for considering the particular features and vulnerabilities of each MANET routing protocol. More specifically, attack signature should be identified for each routing protocol vulnerability. Nevertheless, the IDS architecture should be effective in any case.
Related Work
Most of the current research in MANET security is devoted to provision of preventive protection for the routing protocol, usually by means of an authentication service similar to ours [22, 23, 24] . As a general rule, these solutions are not tolerant to the presence of compromised nodes in the MANET. Alternatives approaches are based in the establishment of security associations between nodes, allowing the use of symmetrical cryptography instead of public key cryptography. These associations may be derived from node synchronization such as in [28, 26] or directly form mobility, allowing local security associations only [29] .
On the other hand, research results on intrusion detection in MANET have only started to appear. Also, published intrusion detection approaches do not address intrusion response yet. This is the case for [19, 10] , where basic MANET IDS architectures have been proposed and preliminary results were presented. An intrusion detection strategy to deal with non-cooperative nodes in ad hoc networks is presented in [27] . However, there isn't any notion of collaborative security services in this approach.
The work in [18] proposes an intrusion-tolerant security solution for the AODV protocol. However, the designed solution doesn't incorporate any preventive (authentication) protection. Instead, only a simple neighbor verification mechanism is used. Unfortunately, this mechanism is based in an erroneous assumption that MAC address cannot be spoofed. Moreover, the intrusion detection mechanism limited only to RREP message flooding, which do not generalize to accomplish all the attacks described in terms of fabrication, modification and impersonation of other routing protocol messages.
Conclusions
We have presented in this paper a novel security model for MANET networks that incorporates both preventive and corrective protections. The security services designed in our proposal are self-organized and have shown to restrict communication and processing overhead among sets of few nearby nodes.
In our approach, vulnerability analysis considers the intrusion detection by defining attack signatures due to anomalies in topology and routing protocol scheduling. The security solution uses both preventive and corrective protections and security services are designed to be self-organized.
Finally, the usage of the same authentication service (MAE) for both routing protocol and security service messages was successful, providing some insights for future research on the preventive protection of the security service messages.
